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This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium study of the causes of the inter-
national Great Depression. We use a fully articulated model to assess the relative contributions
of deﬂation/monetary shocks, which are the most commonly cited shocks for the Depression, and
productivity shocks. We ﬁnd that productivity is the dominant shock, accounting for about 2/3
of the Depression, with the monetary shock accounting for about 1/3. The main reason deﬂation
doesn’t account for more of the Depression is because there is no systematic relationship between
deﬂation and output during this period. Our ﬁnding that a persistent productivity shock is the
key factor stands in contrast to the conventional view that a continuing sequence of unexpected
deﬂation shocks was the major cause of the Depression. We also explore what factors might be
causing the productivity shocks. We ﬁnd some evidence that they are largely related to industrial
activity, rather than agricultural activity, and that they are correlated with real exchange rates and
non-deﬂationary shocks to the ﬁnancial sector.
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Since Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) study of postwar U.S. business cycles, it has
become common practice to measure the relative contributions of diﬀerent shocks to business
cycle ﬂuctuations using dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models. This paper conducts
this type of shock decomposition analysis for the international Great Depression, the 1929—33
period when many countries had macroeconomic declines. The international aspect of the
Great Depression has attracted substantial interest because it brings cross-country evidence
to bear on this singular event.1 Despite the interest in the cross-country aspect of the Great
Depression, we are unaware of any comprehensive cross-country studies using the DSGE
methodology.2 We therefore study macroeconomic activity in 17 countries between 1929 and
1933 using a fully articulated business cycle model. The question we address is: “What
shock(s) caused the international Great Depression?” We ﬁrst assess the type of shocks that
are reasonable to include in a model economy for understanding the international Depression,
and we then assess which shock is the most quantitatively important shock.
Regarding the type of shocks to include in a model economy, the international Great
Depression literature stresses contractionary money/deﬂation shocks operating through im-
perfectly ﬂexible nominal wages. We therefore include deﬂationary shocks operating through
this wage channel in our model. We also include productivity shocks in the model because
there are large and systematic changes in productivity across countries and because the cross-
country relationships between output, deﬂation, and real wages are not easily reconciled by
a sticky wage model driven by only monetary shocks, but can potentially be reconciled with
productivity shocks.
We use the model to measure the relative fractions of output change accounted for by
these two shocks. We ﬁnd that the productivity shock is the dominant shock, accounting for
about 2/3 of the output change in these countries between 1929 and 1933, with monetary
1For example, Bernanke (1995) argues, “To my mind, the most signiﬁcant recent development has been
change in the focus of depression research to a more comparative approach that examines the experiences of
many countries simultaneously.”
2There are recent papers that have examined the Depression within a single country (primarily the United
States) using the DSGE framework, including Beaudry and Portier (2002), Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000),
Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2002, 2004), Crucini and Kahn (1996), Fisher and Hornstein (2002), Perri and
Quadrini (2002). Amaral and MacGee (2002) focus on the Canadian Great Depression with some comparisons
to the U.S. Most of these studies do not attempt a formal shock decomposition analysis.shocks accounting for about 1/3. We also ﬁnd that the quantitative importance of produc-
tivity is robust to modiﬁcations to the model economy. The dominant contribution of the
productivity shock contrasts with the conventional wisdom that the international Depression
was largely a monetary phenomenon.
Given the surprising nature of these ﬁndings, we examine why the money/deﬂation
shock does not account for more of the Depression. The main reason is that the empirical
correlation between deﬂation and output during the Depression is very diﬀerent from that
generated in the economic model by money shocks. Speciﬁcally, money shocks generate a
correlation between deﬂation and output of nearly one in the model, while in the data this
correlation is either negative or close to zero for most of the Depression.
We also conduct a deeper analysis of the productivity shocks to learn more about
them and assess what factors may be driving these shocks. The most striking ﬁnding is that
there is a large positive correlation between the productivity shocks and lagged changes in
real stock prices that is signiﬁcantly larger than the correlation between these variables in
postwar business cycles. We use a version of Aiyagari’s (1994) model to show that the stock
market data provide independent evidence that a highly persistent productivity shock was
the key factor driving the Depression. We also ﬁnd that the productivity shocks are related to
industrial activity, rather than agricultural activity, and that they may be related to ﬁnancial
shocks and real exchange rates, suggesting clues for further investigations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the cross-country data and
discusses the shocks we include in the analysis. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4
discusses the accounting procedure we use to evaluate the contribution of money and pro-
ductivity shocks, the parameterization of the model, and the accounting results, and explains
the ﬁndings. Section 5 discusses alternative explanations of the productivity shocks, includ-
ing capacity utilization, labor hoarding, and other factors. We ﬁnd that these alternative
explanations are not plausible. Section 6 discusses characteristics of the shocks. Section 7
compares the model to the data. Section 8 presents and interprets the correlation between
lagged stock prices and productivity. Section 9 discusses the correlation between productiv-
ity shocks and the industrial share of the economy, ﬁnancial shocks, and real exchange rates.
Section 10 concludes. The Appendix lists data sources, describes technical details about the
2model, and presents additional tables.
2. The Shocks and Summary of the Data
The international Great Depression literature focuses on contractionary money/deﬂation
brought about by the gold standard as the key shock driving the Depression.3 Temin (1989)
argues, “This massive international deﬂationary movement – a 20 percent fall in 2 years –
is a key part of the story of the Great Depression” (1993). Bernanke (2004) argues, “The
collapse of the money supply...that in many ways had a bias toward deﬂation built into it,
seems clearly to have been the major single cause of the Depression.”
Imperfectly ﬂexible wages are cited by the literature as a key channel through which
deﬂation caused the Depression. Bernanke (1995), Bernanke and Carey (1996), and Eichen-
green and Sachs (1985), among others, tell a textbook “deﬂation-sticky wage” story in which
unanticipated deﬂation raises real wages through incomplete nominal wage adjustment and
which reduces employment as ﬁrms move up their labor demand schedules. Table 1 summa-
rizes output, deﬂation, and real wage changes in our panel of countries and provides some
evidence that the deﬂation/high real wage channel contributed to the Depression.4 The ﬁrst
panel of the table shows that, on average, output fell, prices fell, and real wages rose in these
countries. We therefore include monetary shocks operating through the sticky wage channel
in our model.
Our cross-country data, however, suggest that deﬂation is not the only shock driving
the international Great Depression. Figures 1A—D show cross-country scatter plots of log
output deviations from 1929 and the annual percentage change in the price level for each year
through 1933. If deﬂation was the only important shock, then we should see a strong positive
cross-country relationship between price changes and output changes: the countries with the
biggest deﬂations should have had the biggest depressions, and likewise, the countries with
3Eichengreen (1992) discusses the importance of the gold standard in generating and propagating the
worldwide deﬂation.
4The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. Output is real
GNP, the price level is the GNP deﬂator, and the wage rate is for the industrial/manufacturing sector. We
selected these countries because of the availability of GDP, the deﬂator, and a wage index. (The price index
for Czechoslovakia is the CPI rather than the deﬂator.) The data have not been detrended, because there
may be diﬀerences in trends across countries. However, this should not matter too much over the 4-year data
window we consider.
3the smallest deﬂations should have had the smallest depressions. The empirical relationship
between these variables, however, is very diﬀerent. The second panel of Table 1 shows that
the correlation between price changes and output changes are either negative or small in
three of the four depression years. The lack of a strong and systematic positive relationship
between output and deﬂation suggests that it is useful to consider an additional shock.
Table 2 shows the cumulative log change in output and in the deﬂator through 1932
for each of these countries. This table also suggests another shock is operative. The table
shows that many countries had similar deﬂation rates, but had very diﬀerent output changes.
For example, the United States and Italy both had 24 percent deﬂations between 1929 and
1932, but real GNP fell 33 percent in the United States, compared to only a 7 percent decline
in Italy.
We now show that this additional shock appears to be quantitatively important. We
demonstrate this by showing that the best-ﬁtting single shock (log-linearized) model driven
only by unanticipated contemporaneous deﬂation accounts for a small fraction of the inter-
national Great Depression. To see this, ﬁrst note that output change in any log-linearized,
DSGE model without endogenous state variables like capital, and in which unexpected con-
temporaneous deﬂation is the single operative shock, can be written as
yt = απt,
where yt is the log-deviation of output from its steady-state value, πt is deﬂation, and α is the
parameter governing the impact of this deﬂation on output. This approximation is typically
quite accurate over short intervals since capital changes slowly and therefore contributes
comparatively little to business cycle ﬂuctuations in output.
The value of α depends on the details of the particular economic model. In this
exercise, we will ﬁnd the value for α that maximizes the ﬁt by using OLS. We therefore
estimate the following equation for our panel of 17 countries between 1930 and 1933:
4(1) yit = απit + εit,
where the dependent variable is the log-deviation of output between year t and 1929, and
πit is the percentage change in the price level in country i between year t − 1 and t.5 This
regression explains 23 percent of the sum of squared output deviations. The fact that most of
the depression remains unexplained in the best-ﬁtting log-linearized deﬂation model suggests
that the other shock contributing to the Depression is quantitatively important.6
The second shock we include in the model is a productivity shock. There are three
reasons for this choice. The ﬁrst is there are large and systematic changes in productivity
across countries. Figure 2 shows the output change and productivity change for the seven
countries for which we have aggregate productivity data. We have total factor productivity
(TFP) for ﬁve countries (Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) and labor productivity for two countries (Australia and Japan). The ﬁgure shows that
the countries with large depressions (Canada, France, Germany, and the United States) gen-
erally had large productivity declines, and the countries with mild depressions or expansions
(Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom) did not have these large productivity declines.
Appendix table A3 shows this data.
There is also a strong positive relationship between productivity and output in the
11 countries for which we have industrial labor productivity (rather than aggregate labor
productivity) during the Great Depression. The correlation between the log-deviation in
industrial productivity and GDP in 1932 relative to 1929 is 0.64. This is slightly higher than
the annual postwar U.S. correlation between the HP ﬁltered log of real GDP and the HP
5The explanatory power in this particular equation can be viewed as an upper bound because we place no
economic restrictions on the size of the parameter α and because we abstract from any need to use instruments
for deﬂation.
6An alternative interpretation is that the Depression was driven just by deﬂation, but through a more
complicated model that is poorly approximated by a log-linearized model driven solely by contemporaneous
deﬂation. While a comprehensive assessment of this possibility is beyond the scope of this paper, we later
present statistical results for more complicated deﬂation-based models and show that these other models,
including ones with lagged values of deﬂations, and with country-speciﬁc responses to deﬂation, also account
for a small fraction of the Depression.
5ﬁltered log of industrial labor productivity, which is 0.55.7
A second reason we add productivity shocks is the cross-country relationship between
real wages and output. Figures 3A—D show annual scatter plots between log output deviations
from 1929 and real wage changes, and the second panel of Table 1 shows the correlation
between real wages and output. The key feature of these data is that the correlation between
real wages and output is either slightly positive or around zero. This stands in sharp contrast
to the −1 correlation generated by deﬂation in a sticky wage model. The lack of a systematic,
negative correlation means that the second shock needs to be a labor demand shifter,a n da
productivity shock satisﬁes this requirement.
The third reason we choose productivity is because the regression residual from the
output-deﬂation regression estimated above is similar to labor productivity ﬂuctuations in
these countries (for the countries for which we have these data). The correlation between these
two series is 0.40. The fact that productivity is similar to this residual component of output
suggests that productivity is a complementary factor to deﬂation and also suggests that
these two shocks – money and productivity – might account for much of the international
Depression. We therefore abstract from other shocks.8
We stress that our study analyzes the contributions of the shocks that caused the
Depression (1929—33). We do not analyze the recovery from the Depression. A recovery
analysis is important and interesting in its own right, but is beyond the scope of this paper,
because a recovery analysis would need to take into account the diﬀerent types of government
programs countries adopted in response to the Depression. For example, Cole and Ohanian
(2004) present an analysis of these programs for the U.S. recovery and argue that these
programs signiﬁcantly aﬀected the U.S. recovery.
7We computed this value for both HP smoothing parameters 6.25 and 400.
8We also omit other shocks from the model because it is unclear what other shocks are reasonable ones
for the majority of countries, and because introducing other shocks in some cases requires substantial and
complicated changes in the model. For example, some economists suggest that tariﬀs may have been important
for at least some countries, but this would require the development of an open-economy framework for these
17 countries. We therefore restrict the analysis to two shocks, and we later assess whether the productivity
shocks might be serving as proxies for factors that we have omitted.
63. The Model
Quantifying the role of monetary/deﬂa t i o ns h o c k sr e q u i r e sam o d e lw i t ham o n e t a r y
nonneutrality. We follow the conventional view that the nonneutrality during the Great De-
pression operated through imperfectly ﬂexible nominal wages. We introduce nominal wage
inﬂexibility using an information imperfection that is in the spirit of the Lucas (1972) mis-
perceptions model. Speciﬁcally, we assume that households make their labor supply decisions
without full information; they know the nominal wage when choosing their labor supply, but
they don’t know the current innovations to the money supply shocks and productivity shocks.
Qualitatively, this imperfect information model works exactly like a standard predetermined
wage model, but diﬀers quantitatively.9 Before describing our misperceptions model, we
explain the two reasons we use this model rather than a standard predetermined wage model.
The ﬁrst reason is that the nonneutrality of money is much too large in the standard
predetermined wage model, because it predicts way too large a depression for almost every
country in our sample in response to the observed deﬂation rate, and it generates grossly
counterfactual labor productivity. For example, the sticky wage model misses U.S. labor
productivity by 26 percentage points: actual labor productivity is 18 points below its 1929
level, while the sticky wage model generates an 8 percent increase in labor productivity.
We therefore need a model which has a smaller nonneutrality. Our misperceptions model
has a smaller nonneutrality and in log-linearized form is otherwise identical to the standard
predetermined wage model. The Appendix establishes this result.10 Note that our model has
the exact deﬂation—real wage mechanism stressed in the Depression literature.
The second reason is that it is easy to check whether the decomposition results depend
on diﬀerent values of the nonneutrality. This is because the nonneutrality in this mispercep-
tions model takes on a range of values that is governed by the relative variances of the
productivity and money shocks. This means that the shock decomposition results can be
9The sticky wage model we have in mind is one in which workers are imperfect substitutes in production
and set their nominal wages each period before knowing the monetary and productivity shocks. (See Cole
and Ohanian (2001) or Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).)
10Alternatively, we could have reduced the size of the nonneutrality either by shortening the length of the
period in which wages are ﬁxed or by constructing a multisector model in which only some wages are ﬁxed.
Both of these approaches, however, are complicated. The ﬁrst approach is complicated because the data are
available on only an annual frequency. The second approach is complicated because it requires constructing
an explicit multisector model. The misperceptions model is simpler to use than either of these alternatives.
7easily assessed for diﬀerent sizes of the monetary nonneutrality. We now turn to the details
of the misperceptions model.
Preferences: There is a large number of identical households who have preferences
over sequences of a cash good, a credit good, and leisure. We normalize the size of the
population to one.













where c1 is the cash good, c2 is the credit good, and 1−n is nonmarket time. The household
maximizes (2) subject to the following constraints:
mt + wtnt + rtkt +( Tt − 1)Mt
≥ mt+1 + pt [c1t + c2t + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt],
ptc1t ≤ mt +( Tt − 1)Mt.
The household’s nominal wealth is the sum of its beginning-of-period cash holdings
mt, its labor income wtnt, its capital income rtkt, and a lump-sum monetary transfer from the
government (Tt−1)Mt, where Tt is the gross growth rate of the money stock. The household’s
wealth is used to ﬁnance the sum of the cash the household carries into the following period
mt+1 plus its purchases of cash goods, credit goods, and investment pt[c1t + c2t + kt+1 −
(1 − δ)kt].
The cash-in-advance constraint is standard and requires that the stock of cash carried
over by the household from the previous period, plus the lump-sum monetary transfer it
receives from the government, is suﬃcient to pay for cash goods ptc1t.







8where Z is a technology shock that follows a ﬁrst-order lognormal autoregressive process:
Zt = e
ˆ zt, ˆ zt = ρzˆ zt−1 + εzt,ε zt ∼ N(0,σ
2
z).
T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti s
C1t + C2t + Xt ≤ Yt.
The transition rule for capital is
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + Xt.
Monetary Policy: Monetary policy is given by changes in the gross growth rate of
money, which follows a ﬁrst-order lognormal autoregressive process:
Tt =¯ τe
ˆ τt, where ˆ τt = ρτˆ τt−1 + ετt,ε τt ∼ N(0,σ
2
τ).
The change in the money stock at the beginning of the period is thus equal to (Tt − 1)Mt,
and the total money stock at the beginning of the period is given by
Mt+1 = TtMt.
Imperfect Information and the Timing of Transactions: We now specify the
timing of information and the timing of activities within a period. To do this, we ﬁrst need to
deﬁne the state of the economy, which we denote by St =( Kt, ˆ zt−1,ˆ τt−1,ε z
t,ε τ
t). Note that we
include the lagged values of the shocks and their current innovations separately in the state




At the start of a period, the household knows its own state (kt,m t), knows a subset
of the state vector ¯ St =( Kt,ˆ τt−1, ˆ zt−1), and knows the nominal wage. Note that households
do not know the realizations of the money supply or technology innovations. We assume
9that the representative ﬁrm knows the full state vector.11 At this stage, the labor market
opens, and the household and ﬁrm make their labor market choices, given the nominal wage.
Note that households make their labor market choice without knowing the full state vector.
After the labor market closes, the full aggregate state St =( Kt, ˆ zt−1,ˆ τt−1,ε z
t,ε τ
t) is revealed,
and households receive their monetary transfer from the government. The household then
supplies the labor that it previously committed to supply in the labor market. Note that
workers cannot re-contract the quantity of work after they learn the values of the technology
and productivity innovations. (Otherwise, money would be neutral.) At this stage, workers
also rent capital to the ﬁrm and acquire cash consumption goods, credit consumption goods,
and investment goods. At the end of the period, ﬁrms and labor settle their remaining
transactions, with ﬁrms paying households for their labor and capital services, and households
paying ﬁrms for credit consumption goods and investment goods.
A Recursive Formulation: To construct a recursive formulation, we denote the law
of motion for aggregate capital by H(St), and we make the economy stationary by dividing
all period t nominal variables by Mt−1Tt−1, which implies that the normalized beginning-
of-period aggregate money stock is (mt =1 ) . This stationary-inducing transformation also
implies the following rule that governs the transition between the quantity of money chosen
by the household in period t (˜ mt+1) and the quantity of money that the household has at the
start of period t +1( mt+1):
mt+1 =˜ mt+1/Tt.
11These assumptions about the household’s information set and the ﬁrm’s information set are natural to
make in this environment, given that we are using this simple environment to stand in for a richer environment
in a multisector model producing heterogeneous consumer goods. In such an environment, ﬁrms care about
only four variables in the model: their product price, the state of their technology, and the rental prices
of labor and capital. It seems plausible that the ﬁrm would know a lot about these variables just prior to
production. The households in such an environment would care about many more variables than a ﬁrm
would. In particular, the household would care about the entire distribution of prices in the economy. It
seems plausible that households would have only imperfect information about the entire distribution at the
start of the period. To match the larger informational frictions faced by households within our simple model,
we assume that ﬁrms know the full state vector, which implies they know their technology and the prices,
while households do not know the current shocks.
10This transition rule implies that the money stock is constant over time, and we denote this
constant stock as M. We use this transition equation in the household’s budget constraint
below, substituting Ttmt+1 for ˜ mt+1.
The representative household has a two-stage maximization problem in this model.
The Bellman equation for the household is given by








σ +( 1− α)c2t
σ]
1/σ)+φlog(1 − nt)





mt + wtnt + rtkt +( Tt − 1)M ≥ mt+1Tt + pt [kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt + c1t + c2t]
mt +( Tt − 1)M ≥ ptc1t
and subject to the stochastic processes for the shocks. In the ﬁrst stage maximization, the
household chooses its labor supply, given ¯ St and given the nominal wage. Thus, it optimally
forecasts the technology and monetary shocks from the current state and the nominal wage.
This can be seen in the household’s ﬁrst-order condition for choosing labor:
−φ/(1 − nt)+wtE{λt|wt, ¯ St} =0 .
The household equates the marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of
nominal wealth (λt), scaled by the nominal wage. The household solves this expectational
equation using standard signal extraction formulae. We present the details of this signal
extraction in the Appendix.
After the household chooses its labor supply, the full state is revealed and the household
chooses cash goods consumption, credit goods consumption, money holdings for next period,
and investment during the second stage.
Producer’s Problem: The ﬁrm’s maximization problem is standard, because it





1−θ − wtNt − rtKt.
Market-Clearing and Aggregate Consistency Conditions: The market-clearing
conditions are
M = mt+1,
Yt = C1t + C2t + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt,
Nt = nt,
Kt = kt.
The aggregate consistency condition is
kt+1 = H(St),
where H(St) is the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock. In summary, a central
feature of this model is that an unexpected monetary contraction raises the real wage and
drives down employment as stressed in the international Depression literature.
A .T h eR o l eo fI m p e r f e c tI n f o r m a t i o n
This section illustrates how the information imperfection generates the monetary non-
neutrality by analyzing the impact of an i.i.d. money shock in the log-linearized model. There
are two key equations for understanding the nonneutrality of money: the household’s labor-
leisure ﬁrst-order condition and the ﬁrm’s demand-for-labor condition. We ﬁrst consider the
household’s labor-leisure choice. Log-linearizing, we obtain
Misperceptions Model: ˆ wt −
ˆ ntN
1 − N
= −E{ˆ λt|ˆ wt,¯ st},
12where capital letters are steady-state values of variables and the other variables are log-
deviations from the steady state. With imperfect information, the household makes its labor
supply decision by forecasting the marginal value of nominal wealth (ˆ λt), conditioning on the
nominal wage ( ˆ wt) and the restricted state vector (¯ st =( ˆ kt, ˆ zt−1,ˆ τt−1)). (Note that in the
model with full information, the household knows the marginal value of nominal wealth.)
We now show how the household forecasts the marginal value of wealth, and how
money shocks aﬀect employment and output. First, note that the household knows the linear
law of motion for the economy. The equation for ˆ λt is given by





where Dλj is the linearized coeﬃcient on state variable j. Similarly, the wage equation is given
by





Given ¯ st and ˆ wt, the workers forecast











The solution to this standard signal extraction problem is
E{ˆ λt| ˆ wt, ¯ st} − E{ˆ λt|¯ st} = η[ˆ wt − E{ˆ wt|¯ st}],














13The optimal forecast of ˆ λt is given by
E{ˆ λt| ˆ wt, ¯ st} =[ Dλk,D λz,D λτ,ηD wεz,ηD wετ] ∗ st,










The parameter η depends on variances of the money and productivity shock innova-
tions, and on linearization coeﬃcients. This parameter lies between 0 and −1.I ti s0w h e n
the variance of money shocks is 0. This is because with log utility, a productivity shock has
no eﬀect on the marginal value of nominal wealth, and thus Dλεz =0 . It is −1 when the
variance of productivity shocks is 0. This is because money shocks raise the nominal wage
one-for-one, ceteris parabus, and reduce the marginal value of nominal wealth one-for-one
(Dwετ =1 , and Dλεz = −1).
We now use the ﬁrm’s linearized ﬁrst-order condition for labor to show how a money
shock aﬀects labor. This condition is given by
(4) ˆ nt = −
1
θ
(ˆ wt − ˆ pt)+
1
θ
ˆ zt + ˆ kt,
where θ is the exponent on capital in the production function.
Now, consider a one-time negative money shock that ultimately lowers the price level
by 10 percent. This contractionary monetary shock implies that the nominal wage must fall
to clear the labor market. If η = −1 (the case when the variance of the productivity shock
is 0) then money is neutral: the nominal wage falls 10 percent, and this fall leads workers to
revise their forecast of ˆ λt upward by 10 percent. Consequently, there is no change in labor
supply, no change in the real wage, and no change in equilibrium employment or any other
real variable.
Next, we consider the other polar case, which is η =0 . (The variance of money shocks
is 0.) Just as before, the contractionary money shock must also drive down the nominal wage
to clear the labor market. However, in this case the household infers that the lower nominal
14wage is entirely due to the real shock, rather than the monetary shock. Thus, it perceives
that the real return to working has decreased. This misperception leads households to reduce
their labor supply. Consequently, the equilibrium nominal wage falls, but less than the price
level. The real wage rises, and employment and output fall.
The reason that this model has a smaller nonneutrality than the predetermined wage
model is that the nominal wage in this model partially responds to shocks in order to clear
the labor market. The extent of that response depends on the nonneutrality parameter η.
In the standard predetermined wage model, the nominal wage is ﬁxed, which means all the
adjustment comes from the ﬁrms moving up their labor demand curves.
In summary, a contractionary money shock works in this model just as in the standard
international Depression story: a negative money shock drives up the real wage through
deﬂation and imperfect nominal wage adjustment, generating lower employment and output.
4. Accounting for the International Great Depression
We ﬁrst describe our accounting procedure and then report the relative contributions
of the two shocks to the Depression.
A. An Accounting Procedure
We measure the contribution of each shock as the percentage of the sum of squared













where yit is the log-deviation of real output from its 1929 level in country i in period t and
y
p
it is the model-predicted log-deviation of real output from its 1929 level for each shock
individually.
This analysis faces two complications. The ﬁrst is measuring the shocks. Unfortu-
nately, TFP can be constructed for only 5 of the 17 countries, and money shocks are latent
variables.12 Given these limitations, we treat both shocks as latent variables, and we construct
12It might be possible to statistically model the money process and back the shocks out, but there is no
standard statistical model of the money process during this period. Moreover, this would be further com-
plicated by the possibility of money demand shocks. See Field (1984) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
15country-speciﬁc productivity shocks and country-speciﬁc monetary shocks so that output and
the price level in the model for each country and for each year matches the actual output and
price data. We match the price level because of the view in the literature that deﬂation is
an important contributing factor to the Depression. We match output to conduct the shock
decomposition. The shocks are constructed as the variables that solve the two linear equa-
tions from the model that govern the log price deviation and the log output deviation. We
will later compare the constructed productivity shocks in the model to actual productivity.
The second complication is that the constructed shocks have nonzero means and a
nonzero covariance. This has implications for assessing the relative contribution of the two
shocks, because with nonzero means and nonzero covariances, the sum of the two fractions
obtained from (5) may diﬀer from one. We deal with this complication by allocating the
mean and covariance components of the shocks to construct maximum and minimum bounds
on the contribution of each shock so that the sum of the bounds is one.
To do this, we ﬁrst write each shock as the sum of three components: (1) a mean
component (m), (2) an uncorrelated zero-mean component (u), and (3) a correlated zero-
mean component (v). Since the mean terms and covariance terms diﬀer each year, we need
to specify year-speciﬁc mean and covariance components for this decomposition:
εzt = mzt + uzt + vt,
ετt = mτt+ uτt+ γtvt.
Our bounds construction procedure extends the standard variance decomposition procedure
that operates on zero-mean random variables to non-zero-mean random variables. Recall
that the standard variance decomposition problem is to decompose the variance of a random
variable that is the sum of two zero-mean correlated shocks. The standard resolution of this
problem for zero-mean variables is to construct bounds for the contribution of each variable
by attributing the covariance term to one shock and then to the other shock. Our procedure
allocates the covariance term between the shocks in this same way. We also must allocate
the mean components, because the means of the two shocks may be related. For example,
(2004) for some evidence that these shocks were large.
16the mean of the money shock may be a linear function of the mean of the productivity shock.
Since we cannot separate the two means into a common component and an idiosyncratic
component, we construct the bounds by attributing all of the mean components to one shock
and then to the other shock.
The minimum bound for the productivity shock is therefore the fraction of squared
output deviations explained in (5), calculating y
p
it just from the zero-mean orthogonal com-
ponent of the productivity shock, uzt. It is the minimum bound because we are attributing
the contribution from the correlated zero-mean common component (vt) and the mean com-
ponents to the money shock. The minimum bound for the money shock is constructed in
a similar fashion using uτt. We calculate uτt as the residual from a regression of ετt on a
constant and εzt. Recall that because the mean and covariance terms diﬀer each year, this
regression is estimated for each year. Similarly, we calculate uzt as the residual from the
regression of εzt on a constant and ετt. The maximum bound for the money shock is just one
minus the lower bound for the productivity shock, and similarly the maximum bound for the
productivity shock is one minus the lower bound for the money shock.
One interpretation for the lower bound of the contribution of the money shock is that
the money supply process responds to the productivity shock, as would be the case if a central
bank were targeting the gold value of its currency or targeting another endogenous variable.
An interpretation of the lower bound on productivity is that there is an unmodeled impact
of the money shock on productivity, such as changes in capacity utilization.
B. Parameter Values
Table 3 presents the parameter values. A number of these values are standard in the
literature and also do not aﬀect the decomposition results. We set the discount rate to
0.95, the exponent on labor in the production function to 2/3, and the depreciation rate to
7 percent per year, which yields a steady-state capital/output ratio of 2.7. We choose the
preference parameters α and σ such that the steady state of the model matches two long-run
money demand observations: an interest semi-elasticity of money demand of −.08 and an
average velocity level of 3.2. We choose the leisure parameter φ so that households spend
about 1/3 of their time working in the deterministic steady state.
17We choose the autocorrelation coeﬃc i e n tf o rt h et e c h n o l o g ys h o c kt ob e0 . 9 .W ec h o o s e
the autocorrelation coeﬃcient for money growth (ρτ) to be zero, which is consistent with the
average serial correlation of money growth during the gold standard period. We conduct a
sensitivity analysis for values of the money growth serial correlation parameter between −0.5
and 0.5 and ﬁnd that our results were insensitive to values in this range.
The innovation variances for the money supply and the technology shock determine the
size of the impact of an unanticipated money shock on output. We label this nonneutrality
parameter η. We therefore choose a value for η rather than individually choose the innovation
variances. Table 4 displays the impact of a contractionary money shock that reduces the price
l e v e lb y1 0p e r c e n tf o rd i ﬀerent values of η. The maximum nonneutrality decreases hours by
about 15 percent from a 10 percent decrease in the price level. The medium nonneutrality
(η = −.5) d e c r e a s e sh o u r sb ya b o u t1 0p e r c e n ti nr e s p o n s et oa1 0p e r c e n td e ﬂation.13
We choose a benchmark value for η such that productivity changes in the model are
similar to those in the data. This turns out to be the mid-range value, η = −.5. To understand
the implications of η for labor productivity, note that for a money shock of a given size, a large
nonneutrality drives down employment signiﬁcantly by shifting the labor supply schedule.
This increases labor productivity and the real wage. In contrast, in a neutral model, which is
η = −1, a monetary shock will not shift the labor supply schedule, and employment and labor
productivity will be driven entirely by a productivity shock. Thus, contractionary monetary
shocks drive labor productivity higher, with the size of the impact depending on the value
of η, while contractionary technology shocks drive labor productivity lower. We assess the
robustness of the results to diﬀerent values of η. A surprising ﬁnding presented in the next
section is that the relative contributions of productivity and money are fairly insensitive to
diﬀerent values of the nonneutrality parameter η, although labor productivity is sensitive to
this parameter.
13For comparative purposes, we note that a standard predetermined wage model with a 2/3 value for labor
in the production function drives down employment 30 percent from a 10 percent unanticipated deﬂation.
18C. The Relative Contributions of Money and Productivity Shocks
Table 5 presents the lower and upper bounds on the contribution of technology shocks
and money shocks for diﬀerent values of the nonneutrality parameter η. We report the average
value of the bounds for the 1930—33 period. Our main ﬁnding is that the productivity
shock is more important than the money shock. For our preferred value of the nonneutrality
parameter, the bounds for productivity are a maximum of 89 percent and a minimum of
54 percent. The bounds for money, correspondingly, are a maximum of 46 percent and a
minimum of 11 percent. The table also shows that these bounds are not very sensitive to
changes in the value of the nonneutrality parameter. The maximum bound for productivity
ranges between 82 and 100 percent, and its minimum bound ranges between 45 and 48
percent. (It is interesting to note that a standard sticky wage model generates bounds that
are very similar to these.) The midpoints of these bounds suggest that productivity accounts
for about 2/3 of the Depression, and monetary shocks account for about 1/3.
The table also reports the contribution of productivity to the Depression for an al-
ternative orthogonalization procedure that removes the component of the productivity shock
that is related to deﬂation. This orthogonalization procedure is interesting because of the
considerable attention deﬂation has received in the literature. This procedure thus adjusts
the productivity shock for a possible deﬂation-related measurement error, such as capacity
utilization.14 This orthogonal component is the residual from a regression of the productivity
shock on deﬂation. We estimate the regression during each year of the Depression. This
minimizes the contribution of the orthogonal component relative to running one regression
over all four years, and thus provides a conservative estimate of the contribution of this com-
ponent. The contribution of this orthogonal component of productivity is also large, ranging
between 70 and 81 percent for diﬀerent values of η.
D. Understanding Why Money/Deﬂation Is Not the Key Factor
T h er e s u l tt h a tm o n e y / d e ﬂation is not the key driving shock stands in contrast to the
conventional wisdom about the Depression. Given the surprising nature of this ﬁnding, we
14For example, Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) report that productivity declined in U.S. manufacturing in
the Depression, and they interpret that decline as possibly partially due to capacity utilization and/or labor
hoarding.
19explain why money shocks are not more important. The main reason is that the relationship
between deﬂation and output in the data is much diﬀerent from that generated by money
shocks in the model.
The simplest way to understand this is to ﬁrst separate the log output ﬂuctuations
into 2 components for each year: a cross-country mean component and a country-speciﬁc
component:
yit =¯ yt + εit,
where yit is the log deviation of output in country i in year t from its 1929 value, ¯ yt is the
cross-country mean log deviation in year t,a n dεit is the country-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t .
Table 6 shows that the country-speciﬁc component accounts for most of the output
ﬂuctuations. The table also shows that this country-speciﬁc component is not systematically
related to deﬂation. The table shows that the correlation between output and deﬂation,
which is the appropriate measure of the relationship between the country-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t
of output and deﬂation, is negative in 1930 and 1931 and is only signiﬁcantly positive in
1932. In sharp contrast, money shocks generate a correlation between output deviations and
deﬂation in the model that is almost one. This large diﬀerence between the data and the
model is the key reason why money/deﬂation does not account for more of the Depression. In
particular, while deﬂation does account for some of the mean component of the Depression,
it is unable to account for the much larger country-speciﬁc component. Note that the weak
empirical relationship between output and deﬂation is also the reason deﬂation accounts for
only a small fraction of the Depression in the regression presented in Section 2.
5. Alternative Explanations for the Productivity Shocks
We now ask whether the large contribution of the productivity shocks might be due to
some other factors that this version of our model does not capture. We discuss three factors
that we consider possibly important in this regard: (1) unmeasured factor utilization, which
is a common interpretation of procyclical productivity, (2) allowing for the eﬀects of lagged
values of deﬂation, which may reduce the explanatory power of productivity shocks, and (3)
20allowing for diﬀerences in the nonneutrality of money between countries, which may reduce
the importance of productivity shocks.
The ﬁrst possibility we consider is that the productivity shocks are due to unmeasured
factor utilization, speciﬁcally, deﬂation-induced capacity utilization. Our results suggest that
the productivity shocks are not just due to deﬂation-induced capacity utilization. If this were
the explanation, then the productivity shock would be strongly related to deﬂation. It is not;
recall that Table 5 showed that about 75 percent of the international Depression is accounted
for by a productivity shock that is orthogonal to deﬂation. There are other reasons that the
productivity shocks are not accounted for just by capacity utilization. In particular, labor
productivity fell signiﬁcantly in some countries, including the United States and Canada. If
the productivity shocks were just due to capacity changes, then labor productivity would be
higher, not lower.15 Moreover, the limited explanatory power of deﬂa t i o ni nt h er e g r e s s i o n
presented in Section 2 suggests that deﬂation-induced capacity utilization is not the key
factor. We have focused here on capacity utilization, rather than labor hoarding, because
labor hoarding seems less plausible given the long duration of the Depression. However,
some of these same facts have similar implications for labor hoarding explanations, such as
the limited explanatory power of regression in Section 2. Additional evidence against the
deﬂation—labor hoarding view is that labor hoarding cannot account for the positive cross-
country relationship between real wages and output in the data. If the productivity shocks
were due to deﬂation and labor hoarding, the correlation between real wages and output would
be strongly negative. We conclude that if unmeasured factor utilization were quantitatively
important, it would be through a shock other than deﬂation.16
The second possibility we consider is if the large contribution of the productivity shock
is due to the fact that the monetary nonneutrality operates only through contemporaneous
15This follows from the fact that the capital/labor ratio rises in response to higher real wages as long as
there is nonzero substitutability between capital and labor.
16While the data indicate that productivity shocks are not plausibly accounted for just by unmeasured factor
utilization responding to deﬂation, it remains an open question how much these factors – if introduced in
our model – might change our decomposition. Recent work on the U.S. Depression, however, suggests the
decomposition may not change much. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) introduce capacity utilization into
a business cycle model for the Depression and ﬁnd that the contribution of productivity shocks is relatively
unchanged. This is due to two oﬀsetting eﬀects: the modiﬁed model with capacity utilization reduces the
size of the productivity shocks, but the equilibrium response in the modiﬁed model to a productivity shock
is larger than in the standard model.
21deﬂa t i o ni no u rm o d e l . 17 To assess whether lagged values of deﬂation might be important
for our results, we estimated regressions with lagged and contemporaneous deﬂation terms
to see if the possible explanatory power of deﬂation was larger than in the regression with






The lagged deﬂation terms control for the impact of changes in endogenous state
variables, such as changes in the capital stock, habit formation, adjustment costs, and so on, as
well as other lagged eﬀects of the shocks, such as the possibility of long-lived nonneutralities.
We use OLS to estimate models with one and two lags, as well as the contemporaneous term.
(Additional lags did not change the explanatory power of the model.)
The explanatory power of the regression did not change much with the addition of these
lags. The fraction of squared output change explained in the regression with contemporaneous
deﬂation and two lagged terms is 31 percent, compared to 23 percent in the regression with
just the contemporaneous term. This deﬂation regression has limited explanatory power
because even with lagged terms, deﬂation accounts for very little of the country-speciﬁc
output component. To see this, we added a constant term to this regression, and we compared
the explanatory power from the regression with a constant term and the deﬂation terms to
the explanatory power from the regression with just the constant term.
The regression with a constant and three deﬂation terms explains 33 percent of squared
output change. Moreover, all the deﬂation coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
The regression with the constant term alone explains 27 percent of squared output change.
Thus, adding the three deﬂation terms to the regression with just the constant adds only
6 percent more explanatory power. Since the constant term controls for mean eﬀects, this
17It is worth noting that as yet there is no canonical, fully articulated model in which lagged values of
deﬂation have large, depressing eﬀects. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) develop a
model in which there is a longer-lived nonneutrality than in standard sticky wage models, but in their model,
deﬂation increases output, rather than decreases output.
22implies that both contemporaneous and lagged deﬂation account for very little of the key
country-speciﬁc output component in this regression.
We next investigate whether the large contribution of the productivity shocks might
depend on the parameterization that all countries have the same value for the nonneutrality
parameter (η). The best way to pursue this possibility would be based on theory or evidence
about cross-country diﬀerences that aﬀected the responsiveness of nominal wages to shocks.
This information could then be used to choose diﬀerent values for η. Since we are unaware of
any studies along these lines, we ﬁrst tried to empirically assess diﬀerences in the nonneutrality
of money across countries by estimating the relative impact of a money shock on output using
data from the early 1920s when most of these countries also experienced large deﬂations. We
formed this estimate for each country as the ratio of the change in real output to deﬂation
from this period. We then examined the correlation between these forecasts and our inferred
productivity shock and found it to be extremely low. This test suggested that our productivity
shocks were not good proxies for country-speciﬁc nonneutralities.
We therefore adopted a diﬀerent approach. We split the 17 countries into two groups
based upon whether they had a large or a small fall in output, and we then assigned a diﬀerent
value for the nonneutrality parameter to each group. We chose to split the countries into two
groups because the output changes in these countries tend to cluster into two groups: one
group has small output changes and the other group has large depressions. Both groups have
roughly the same deﬂation.
The ﬁrst group includes the six countries that had large depressions: Austria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, and the United States. In 1932, average output in this
group was about 25 percent lower than in 1929, with a standard deviation of about 9 per-
cent. We assigned these large depression countries the maximum value of our nonneutrality
parameter (η =0 )s ot h a td e ﬂation would have a large, depressing eﬀect. The second group
is the remaining 11 countries that had small output changes: Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom. We assigned the small nonneutrality value (η =0 .75) to these countries because they
had small output declines. In 1932, average output in this group was about 3 percent lower
than in 1929, with a standard deviation of about 6 percent.
23This ad hoc classiﬁcation procedure is not based on any theory or evidence about
diﬀerences in monetary nonneutrality across these countries. Rather, we chose this procedure
because it increased the contribution of money shocks by allocating a large nonneutraltiy to
the big depression countries and a small nonneutrality to the countries with small downturns.
We were surprised that this procedure did not signiﬁcantly change the decomposition results.
Table 7 shows the results. The lower bound for the fraction of output change accounted
for by productivity is 47 percent in this experiment, compared to about 52—54 percent in
the benchmark experiment. This means that the upper bound for money is only marginally
higher in this experiment: 53 percent, compared to about 46—48 percent in the benchmark
experiment. The upper bound for productivity in this experiment remains at 88 percent.
Some readers have asked how much of the Depression could be accounted for by mon-
etary shocks rather than productivity if each country had its own optimized nonneutality
parameter value, irrespective of any theory or evidence supporting these values. This is not
a very interesting question, because this parameterization is not only ad hoc but it also loses
the cross-sectional aspect of the international Depression that has motivated the literature.
But even with this extreme parameterization, we found that monetary shocks do not account
for much of the Depression. We reached this conclusion by estimating a modiﬁed version of
(1) in which there are county-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients for the deﬂation variable, and since we do
not have productivity variables for each country, we use proxies for productivity by including
ac o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc constant term in the regression:
yit = αi + γiπit + εit.
Almost all of the explanatory power in this regression is due to the constant terms, rather
than deﬂation. The deﬂation slope coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
R2 is almost the same with deﬂation omitted from the equation as when all the terms are
included. The R2 is 0.84 with all the deﬂation terms, and is 0.78 without any deﬂation terms.
These results suggest that country-speciﬁcd e ﬂation responses provide almost no incremental
information about the Depression.
This discussion suggests that the large contribution of productivity shocks is not sig-
24niﬁcantly aﬀected by these alternative factors. The ﬁndings also have implications for those
readers whose reaction to these results is to wonder whether there are plausibly parameter-
ized deﬂation-driven models in which deﬂation is the dominant factor and productivity is
unimportant. Addressing this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but our ﬁndings do
highlight the challenges that pure deﬂation-driven models face. In particular, a key challenge
is that neither deﬂation nor lagged deﬂation are systematically related to output.
A. Comparing Our Findings to the Literature
We now compare our ﬁndings to those in the literature, though this literature diﬀers
in important ways. One strand of the literature uses general equilibrium models, but these
studies typically analyze a single country, rather than a cross section, and typically do not
conduct a shock decomposition analysis. With this in mind, we ﬁnd that our results are
largely consistent with the results from these single-country studies, which cover 5 of the 17
countries analyzed here. These include the United States (Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2000),
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), and Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000)), Canada (Amaral
and MacGee (2002)), Germany (Fisher and Hornstein (2002)), France (Beaudry and Portier
(2002)), and Italy (Perri and Quadrini (2002)). Seven of these nine papers study productivity
shocks and generally ﬁnd a role for this shock, though only Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
conduct a shock decomposition. Few of these papers study the role of monetary shocks.
Cole and Ohanian (2001), Amaral and MacGee, and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan suggest
that money played some role but was not the major factor. The one paper that argues
that deﬂation—sticky wages is the dominant factor for the United States is Bordo, Erceg,
and Evans (2000). Their ﬁndings diﬀer from ours and from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan’s
ﬁndings because their one-shock model abstracts from productivity shocks. Consequently,
their model counterfactually predicts very high labor productivity during the Depression. It
is likely that their ﬁndings would have been similar to ours and those of Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan if they had included a productivity shock, as the model economy that they use
is similar to the one used by us and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan.
The second strand of the literature is cross-country regression studies, including Bernanke
(1995), Bernanke and Carey (1996), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), and Choudhri and Kochin
25(1980). This literature is really not comparable, because these studies use a very diﬀerent
methodology. They focus on a diﬀerent issue, which is the recovery from the Depression
rather than the causes of the Depression. They do not include productivity shocks. They use
diﬀerent measures of output and prices, and they include post-Depression (post-1933) data
in the analysis. These papers argue that monetary forces operating through sticky wages
are a key factor for recovery from the Depression, and they report a negative relationship
between industrial production (IP) and a nominal wage rate deﬂated by a wholesale price
index (WPI).18
To try to compare our ﬁndings to those in this literature, it is necessary to ﬁrst sort
out the diﬀerence between the positive wage-output correlation reported in this paper and the
negative relationship reported in these other papers. There are two issues: the measurement
of the real wage and the years covered by the analysis. Regarding measurement, this literature
uses the wholesale price index to deﬂate the nominal wage, but this is not the right price index
to use because the sticky-wage theory requires that the wage be deﬂated by the price of ﬁnal
output, but the wholesale price index is based primarily on a bundle of raw input prices.19
Regarding the years of observation, our analysis focuses solely on the Depression years. This
other literature mixes data from part of the Depression and from the post-Depression period.
(For example, Bernanke’s study omits the ﬁrst year of the Depression (1930), and includes
two post-Depression years (1934—35).
We previously established that the correlation between real GDP and the wage deﬂated
by the GDP deﬂator is largely positive in the Depression (1930—33). It also turns out that
the correlation between IP and the wage deﬂated by the WPI is largely positive during this
period (see Table 8). The correlation between real GDP and the wage deﬂated by the deﬂator
changes after 1933, becoming negative. A similar pattern emerges for IP and the wage deﬂated
by the WPI. This change in the correlation sign between real GDP and the wage relative
to the deﬂator raises the possibility that monetary forces working through sticky wages may
18Choudhri-Kochin do not focus on the relationship between output and real wages, but on the relationship
between output and prices for a small group of countries. Our comments below about output and real wages
also apply to output and prices in this paper.
19Moreover, the composition of wholesale indexes diﬀers substantially across countries, which further com-
plicates cross-country comparisons.
26have been more important for the recovery from the Depression rather than as a cause of the
Depression. It should be noted that this evidence does not establish the importance of this
factor for the recovery because of the omission of other variables, including productivity and
the large government policy changes that were adopted in many countries at the end of the
Depression. As discussed in Section 2, addressing the relative importance of monetary and
other shocks for the post-Depression period would require a parameterized general equilibrium
model that would go well beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore conclude that the
cross-country regression literature does not have implications for our decomposition results.
6. The Characteristics of the Shocks
We now examine the shocks for our preferred parameterization of η = −0.50. Table
9 reports some statistics on both the money and productivity shocks. The mean money
and productivity shock is negative in every year except the ﬁrst year, 1930. The reason for
the positive 1930 productivity shock is that there was a large deﬂation in 1930, but average
output fell only slightly in that year (see Table 1). Under this parameterization, the actual
productivity deviation, z, is negative in every year after 1930, despite the residual eﬀects of
the 1930 positive productivity shock. This is not true under parameterizations with higher
degrees of the nonneutrality of money.
It is interesting to note that the coeﬃcient of variation (the standard deviation divided
by the mean) of the productivity shock tends to be larger than that of the money shock, much
as the coeﬃcient of variation of output change is larger than the coeﬃcient of variation of
deﬂation (see Table 1). Thus, the large variation in output due to the large idiosyncratic
component described in the preceding section is largely being generated by the productivity
shock.
The ﬁnal panel of the table shows that the shocks are not highly correlated for most of
the Depression. This means that most of the diﬀerence between the minimum and maximum
bounds is due to the allocation of the nonzero means of the shocks, rather than the covariance
between the shocks. The fact that the covariance is small in most years provides further
support for the independent contribution of the productivity shock.
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To further assess the plausibility of our results, we next compare the model predictions
to the actual data. We focus on comparing actual productivity with productivity from the
model. This is very useful because we have aggregate productivity for 7 of the 17 countries
(TFP for Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and labor
productivity for Australia and Japan). This analysis thus provides a useful diagnostic for our
model. If the model is successful, there should be a close relationship between productivity in
the model and actual productivity. We ﬁnd a very close relationship between these variables.
Figure 4 summarizes these data by plotting the actual productivity in each country
and each year against the corresponding productivity in the model. The ﬁgure clearly shows
a strong, systematic relationship between the actual and model productivity. The correlation
between these variables is about 0.91. Appendix table A4 shows these data. The fact that
the model constructs productivity shocks that line up closely with actual productivity means
that the model is accurately decomposing the fraction of output change into changes due to
input and changes due to productivity.
Our next productivity comparison goes beyond these 7 countries by examining pro-
ductivity in the model and the data for countries in which we have labor productivity in
the industrial sector. We have industrial labor productivity for 14 of the 17 countries (all
the countries except Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Switzerland).20 We therefore calculate
the correlation between the log-deviation in total factor productivity and labor productivity
in the model between 1929 and 1932 for the 11 countries for which have these data, and
between 1930 and 1932 for the 14 countries for which we have these data. These correlations
are fairly high, 0.63 and 0.60, respectively, for total factor productivity and 0.59 to 0.35, re-
spectively, for labor productivity. To benchmark these correlations, note that they are close
to the postwar cyclical correlations between these variables (0.72 for TFP and 0.56 for labor
productivity).21 These comparisons provide further support for our output decomposition
20For Austria, France, and Germany, data limitations allowed us to use only changes from their 1930 levels.
21The reported correlations are for HP ﬁltered data where the ﬁltering parameter was set to 400. We also
computed these correlations for a ﬁltering parameter of 6.25, but the results were very similar: 0.58 and 0.78,
respectively. We focus on the values generated by the larger ﬁltering parameter since we are not detrending
the data for the Great Depression.
28results.
Our next comparison is between the real wage rate in the model and the real wage
rate in the data. This comparison is more complicated because of a number of measurement
problems. These include (1) cyclical compositional changes among workers, (2) the wage
rate in the model is for the aggregate economy, but the measured wage rate is just for the
industrial sector, (3) the size and composition of the industrial sectors diﬀer across countries,
(4) wage survey methodologies may diﬀer across countries, and (5) data transcription errors
may be large for some countries.22 W ea r ea b l et om a k es o m ea d j u s t m e n t sf o rt h eﬁrst two
of these problems but unfortunately not for the others
Regarding compositional changes in workers, the average quality of workers tends to
rise during depressions, because the least experienced and least productive employees are
typically the ﬁrst to be laid oﬀ. We have addressed this measurement problem by composi-
tionally adjusting the wage rate in the model, using the postwar U.S. estimates of cyclical
labor composition bias produced by Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994).23 Regarding the issue
that the measured wage is only for the industrial sector of the economy, we provide a bench-
mark for interpreting the relationship between the model wage and the actual industrial wage
by showing the relationship between these variables during postwar U.S. business cycles. We
therefore calculated the cyclical correlation between industrial wages and the aggregate wage
using postwar U.S. HP-ﬁltered data and obtained a value that ranges between 0.48 and 0.8,
depending on the value of the smoothing parameter.24 The correlation in three of the four
Depression years is reasonably high, ranging from 0.53 to 0.67, with a low of 0.26 in 1933,
and is comparable to the postwar U.S. values, particularly given that the Depression wage
measures may have signiﬁcantly more measurement error.
The ﬁnal comparison we can make is between the money supply in our model and
22Regarding this latter measurement issue, we found that the nominal wage rate in some countries is
constant for a sequence of years, which will tend to lead to positive measurement error during deﬂationary
periods.
23The log-deviations in model real wages, w, were generated according to w∗ = w − 0.49 ∗ n, where n,t h e
employment share, is serving as a proxy for unemployment. We compositionally adjust the model wages since
we have measures of employment in the model for all of our countries.
24The correlation is 0.48 for a smoothing parameter of 400 and is 0.84 for a smoothing parameter of 6.25.
The U.S. series are average hourly earnings for manufacturing and average hourly earnings for the private
economy, from 1955 to 2003.
29that in the data. This comparison is complicated because there is some evidence of money
demand shocks during the Depression (see Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) and Field
(1984)), but our model abstracts from this feature. This means that even though our model
matches the price level, there may be a diﬀerence between the money supply in the model
a n di nt h ed a t a . 25 Despite abstracting from money demand shocks, we ﬁnd a correlation
between the model money supply and the actual money supply that ranges between 0.5 and
0.7 for three of the four Depression years. (The correlation is about 0.3 in 1930.)
Overall, we ﬁnd that these comparisons between the model and the data – particularly
for productivity – suggest our decomposition results are plausible. We now turn to learning
more about these productivity shocks.
8. Productivity Shocks and the Stock Market
The productivity shocks we feed in the model have a large persistent component,
which means that once a negative shock is realized, it is expected to continue into the future.
This stands in contrast to the existing view that the persistence of the Depression was due
to a sequence of transitory surprises (see Lucas in Klamer (1983)). These alternative views
about the persistence of the shock have very diﬀerent implications for the Depression, and
we now try to shed some light on this persistency issue. If a persistent shock is key for
the Depression, then we would expect that economic agents recognized this. This section
explores this possibility by correlating real stock prices – which are forward looking – with
future productivity shocks in our model. We will show a very high correlation between lagged
stock prices and the productivity shock. Given this high correlation, we will then use this new
information to provide an independent assessment of the relative contribution of productivity
shocks to the Depression.
The correlation between real industrial stock prices, lagged one year (measured as
log deviations from 1929), and TFP from our model is 0.75. To benchmark this value, we
25Note that we could add a money demand shifter in this model by making the cash goods preference
parameter a random variable. To speciﬁcally see how our model that abstracts from this feature would tend
to generate a money supply that diﬀered from the actual money supply, suppose there is a shock to money
demand that lowers the price level by 1 percent. Note that our model without the money demand shock
would generate this lower price level through a negative money supply shock. Thus, the money supply shocks
that our model requires will reﬂect both money supply and money demand shocks, and thus will tend to
diﬀer from observed changes in the money supply.
30compare it to the cyclical correlation between lagged real stock prices and TFP in postwar
annual U.S. data (1951—2003), which is 0.38 for the Dow Jones Industrials. Thus, there is
a much stronger correlation between the stock market and future productivity during the
Depression than in postwar cyclical ﬂuctuations.26
This high correlation between the lagged stock market and productivity suggests that
these productivity shocks were perceived to be very persistent. We examine the economic
signiﬁcance of this implication by extending a model developed by Aiyagari (1994) to say
more about the perceived persistence of the productivity shock and to provide additional
evidence on the relative contribution of productivity shocks to the Depression. Aiyagari used
his model to measure the contributions of productivity shocks to postwar U.S. ﬂuctuations,
and we extend his model by including the stock market. This augmented Aiyagari model will
use the correlation between the lagged stock market and productivity to show (1) that the
high correlation is indeed consistent with a highly persistent productivity process, and (2)
that our original estimate that 2/3 of the Depression is due to productivity shocks is very
conservative.
Aiyagari’s original model has three log-linearized equations: a standard production
function (that abstracts from capital); an equation governing the evolution of labor in re-
sponse to two shocks – productivity and another labor shifter; and the autoregressive process
for the productivity shock. These equations are
y = z +( 2 /3) ∗ n, (6)
n = γz + ω, (7)
z = ρzz−1 + ε. (8)
In these equations, y is the log of output, z is productivity, n is labor, and ω is the other
shock driving labor. The parameter ρz governs the autocorrelation of productivity. The
shocks ε and ω are independent, mean zero, normally distributed random variables. Note
26We HP ﬁltered the postwar U.S. time series to isolate the cyclical ﬂuctuations and thus make the series
reasonably comparable to the Depression observations, which are log changes from their 1929 values.
31that this framework is consistent with our misperceptions model. Abstracting from capital,
both setups share the same production function, the same law of motion for the productivity
shock, and the same equation that governs the evolution of labor.
Aiyagari chose the variance of ω and the value of the parameter γ so that the model
matches (i) the observed correlation between cyclical labor productivity and cyclical output,
and (ii) the observed variance of the ratio of cyclical hours to cyclical output. This para-
meterization of Aiyagari’s model implied that productivity shocks account for about 3/4 of
postwar U.S. ﬂuctuations.
We extend his model to include an equation for the value of the stock market, which
will allow us to use the correlation between lagged stock prices and productivity. In addition
to equations (6)—(8), we add the following stock market equation:
s = δz + βω + ξ.
The variable s is the value of the stock market, and ξ is a noise term. This equation would
arise in an augmented version of our model in which there are adjustment costs to investment
and noise movements in stock prices. These noise movements in stocks could include time
v a r i a t i o ni nr i s kp r e m i ao ro t h e rf a c t o r st h a td on o ta ﬀect output, as well as measurement
error. The innovations ε, ω, and ξ are i.i.d. processes.
We set ρz =0 .90. We choose the other six parameters – standard deviations of ε, ω,
and ξ, and the coeﬃcients γ, δ, and β – to match six moments from the postwar period: the
variances and covariances of postwar HP ﬁltered real GDP, employment, and the real value
of the Dow Jones Industrials index.27 Given these parameter values, the productivity shock
accounts for 64 percent of postwar output ﬂuctuations, and the model implies a correlation
of 0.40 between the lagged stock market and productivity for the postwar U.S. economy.
This is very close to the actual correlation of 0.38 between these variables for the postwar
period. This suggests that the observed postwar correlation between lagged stock prices and
productivity is consistent with productivity accounting for about 2/3 of cyclical ﬂuctuations.
27The parameterization is given by σε =0 .0064, σω =0 .0220, σx =0 .1066, γ =0 .5056, δ =3 .5877, and
β =0 .3671.
32How much would we need to change the model parameters in order to understand the
0.75 correlation between these variables? Equation (9) shows how the correlation between

















z). This equation shows how increases in the persistence of the produc-
tivity process (ρz), decreases in the amount of stock market noise (σξ), and/or an increase in
the variability of productivity shocks (σε) or a decrease in the variability of the labor shifter
(σω) aﬀect the correlation between lagged stock prices and productivity. We now vary these
parameters to see what changes are required to increase the correlation from 0.40 (the post-
war correlation) to 0.75 (the Depression correlation). In all of these experiments, we keep the
variability of y ﬁxed.
We ﬁrst change ρz (and simultaneously reduce σε to keep σz ﬁxed, which also keeps
the variance of output ﬂuctuations ﬁxed). We ﬁnd that even raising ρz to 1 generates a
correlation of only 0.44, while if we lower it to 0.5 the correlation falls to 0.22. Thus, higher
persistence alone cannot come close to accounting for the high Depression correlation. Lower
persistence, however, makes it even more diﬃcult to account for this higher correlation.
We next reduce the variance of the noise term, keeping all other parameter values equal
to their benchmark values, to generate the 0.75 correlation. By reducing the relative variance
of the noise term, this experiment makes the stock market a more accurate forecaster of the
productivity shock. We ﬁnd that the relative variance of the noise term must fall by more
than 90 percent to generate the 0.75 correlation. (We stress that this is a relative reduction
in the variance of the noise term, because the values of the other parameters are ﬁxed. Thus,
this does not imply that the variance of the noise fell in absolute terms in the Depression,
because the variance of output was much higher during this period.) Thus, accounting for
the higher correlation though this channel requires that the noise term become relatively very
small. In interpreting our ﬁndings, note that since the variation in y rose enormously, it was
not necessary for the stock market noise to actually fall, it was only necessary for it not to
33rise nearly as much as the variability of output. For example, the cross-sectional variance of
output during the Great Depression in 1932 was roughly 20 times as big as the variance of
output around the HP trend in the postwar U.S. data that we calibrated our model to.
We next consider changing the variance of the productivity shock (σε) while we si-
multaneously reduce the variance of the other shock (σω) in order to keep the variance of
output ﬁxed. We ﬁnd that if we raise σε so that the contribution of the productivity shock
to the variance of output is 100 percent, the correlation rises to only 0.47. In contrast, if
we reduce the contribution of productivity shocks so that they account for only 1/3 of the
Depression, the correlation falls to 17 percent. This indicates that while raising the share
of productivity in the variability of output can help account for the observed correlation, it
cannot do it alone. It also highlights the tension involved in accounting for the correlation
under the assumption that productivity’s contribution to the Depression was small.
These quantitative experiments indicate that the Great Depression lagged stock price—
productivity correlation was extreme. Achieving this correlation requires a relatively small
noise component and a persistent productivity shock that accounts for at least 2/3 of the
Depression. The stock market thus provides independent evidence that the productivity
shock was an important contributing factor to the Depression.
9. What Factors Are Driving these Productivity Shocks?
We now explore what deeper factors might be driving these productivity shocks. We
do this by correlating the productivity shock with other country-speciﬁc variables. Our choice
of variables is based on the extent to which theory suggests they may shed light on the shocks,
and also on data availability. We consider four variables. Two variables are related to inter-
national transactions: the size of each country’s trade share (measured as a fraction of GDP
in 1929) and the value of the real exchange rate (measured as the change in the real exchange
rate relative to 1929). The other two variables are the size of each country’s agricultural
sector in 1929 and Bernanke and James’ (1990) measure of banking panics/distress.28 The
international variables are interesting because in open economy models, shocks to interna-
28This banking panic variable is a 0,1 variable, in which the authors subjectively assess whether a country is
having a panic or not. The authors construct this variable each month, so the annual measure is the fraction
of the year a country had a panic.
34tional trade in intermediate inputs will appear as a productivity shock in a closed economy
model that abstracts from intermediate inputs. The banking panic variable is interesting for
a similar reason; in models in which ﬁnancial services are intermediate inputs, a reduction
in ﬁnancial services will also appear as a productivity shock in a technology that abstracts
from these inputs. The size of the agricultural sector is interesting because it can shed light
on the extent to which the Depression was largely an industrial phenomenon.
Table 10 shows these correlations for 1932, which is near the trough for most of the
countries. The most promising variables that seem to merit future study are the size of the
agricultural share, the real exchange rate, and the banking panic. (Surprisingly, we found a
very small correlation between productivity and the size of the trade share.)
The positive correlation between the size of the agricultural sector and productivity
means that the Depression was more severe for the highest industrialized countries, suggest-
ing that the shock originated in, or more signiﬁcantly aﬀected, industrial economic activity
rather than agricultural activity. The correlation between the real exchange rate and the
productivity shock means that countries that had higher productivity shocks had lower real
exchange rates. There are diﬀerent interpretations of this correlation, because the real ex-
change rate is an endogenous variable. One possible interpretation might follow along the
lines of Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), who argue that interwar changes in the real exchange
rate are driven by devaluations which increased demand. Pursuing this interpretation would
be of interest for future work and would require connecting this demand-induced channel to
productivity. (This correlation is somewhat sensitive to timing, however, because the corre-
lation is in the 0.2—0.3 range in 1931 and 1933.) The correlation between the banking panic
variable and productivity indicates that countries with more severe banking panics had neg-
ative productivity shocks. This correlation is somewhat sensitive, however, to the inclusion
of the United States and Austria; the correlation between this variable and productivity is
about −0.3 without these two countries in the sample. Future work along these lines could
be aimed at further quantiﬁcation of banking and perhaps more broadly, ﬁnancial market
shocks, and at developing models in which ﬁnancial shocks have large and systematic eﬀects
on productivity.
3510. Summary and Conclusion
This paper presented a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium study of the causes of
the international Great Depression, the 1930—33 period in which many countries experienced
macroeconomic downturns. We developed a fully articulated model to assess the relative
contributions of monetary/deﬂation shocks, which are the most commonly cited shocks for
the Depression, and productivity shocks. In our model, deﬂation reduces output through
imperfectly ﬂexible wages, which is the key channel stressed in the literature. This mechanism
is driven by an information imperfection in our model that allows us to easily vary the impact
of a money shock by parameterizing the size of the nonneutrality of money.
We used the model to evaluate the fraction of output change accounted for by each
of these shocks for 17 countries between 1930 and 1933. Because of data availability, our
analysis faced some challenges in terms of identifying the shocks. We therefore developed
a new analytical procedure in which we constructed monetary and productivity shocks so
that the model completely accounted for output and price changes in the Depression. Given
these constructed shocks, we also developed a new accounting procedure that constructs
decomposition bounds for the contribution of nonzero-mean shocks.
Our main ﬁnding is surprising: productivity is the dominant shock, accounting for
about 2/3 of the Depression, with the monetary shock accounting for about 1/3. The pro-
ductivity shock is also largely orthogonal to deﬂation. We tested the model by comparing the
productivity shocks in the model to actual productivity changes in seven countries for which
we have productivity data. For our preferred calibration of the nonneutrality of money, we
found that the constructed shocks and actual productivity changes are extremely similar, with
a correlation of 0.91. We also concluded that productivity was an important contributing fac-
tor, even considering capacity utilization, labor hoarding, and diﬀerences in the nonneutrality
of money across countries. The main reason monetary/deﬂation shocks are unimportant is
that there is no systematic correlation between deﬂation and output in the data. Speciﬁ-
cally, most output ﬂuctuations in our panel of countries are country-speciﬁc, and this large
country-speciﬁc component is unrelated to deﬂation. This suggests that linear models driven
exclusively by deﬂation shocks will not account for the bulk of the international Depression.
We also found a very high correlation between lagged stock prices and the productivity
36shocks, much higher than observed during U.S. postwar ﬂuctuations. We used a version of
Aiyagari’s (1994) model to interpret this correlation and found that the stock market evidence
is also consistent with a very persistent productivity process driving the international Great
Depression. Our ﬁnding that a highly persistent productivity shock is the key factor stands in
contrast to the conventional view that a continuing sequence of unexpected deﬂation shocks
was the major cause of the Depression.
What are these productivity shocks? Given that we did not ﬁnd them plausibly
explained by capacity utilization or labor hoarding, we correlated the shocks with other
variables to learn more about them. We found some support for the view that the shocks hit
the industrial sector, rather than the agricultural sector, and that the shocks may be related
to ﬁnancial panics and changes in the real exchange rate. Future research should develop and
analyze theories that can shed light on what these productivity-like shocks might be standing
in for in our simple growth model. Possibilities include breakdowns in borrowing/lending
relationships and credit (see Bernanke (1983)), large decreases in organization/information
capital (see Ohanian (2001)), or government policy interventions that aﬀected eﬃciency, such
as Herbert Hoover’s jawboning of U.S. ﬁrms to practice work sharing rather than use layoﬀs
during the downturn (see Cole and Ohanian (2001)).
The key point is that any candidate factor cannot be a shock that aﬀects only inputs.
Rather, a candidate factor must work so that it looks like a productivity shock in a simple
neoclassical production function, and the factor must be largely uncorrelated with deﬂation.
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4011. Appendix
A. Data
The primary sources of the data are from B.R. Mitchell’s International Historical
Statistics. These are available for (i) Europe, (ii) Africa, Asia, and Oceania, and (iii) the
Americas. This includes the majority of the data on real and nominal GDP, industrial wages,
production and prices, as well as the agricultural and industrial shares of GDP. Data on the
stock market and gold parities come from the League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks from
1933 to 1940. Where available, we have used the latest oﬃcial publications of historical data.
This includes the data for Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. We have also endeavored to use the latest revisions of data where available. This
includes the data for France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. Listed bellow are the data sources
by country. Unless otherwise indicated, the data used are from B.R. Mitchell and the League
of Nations.
Australia
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator: Butlin, M.W., 1977, A Preliminary Annual
Database 1900/01 to 1973/74, Research Discussion Paper 7701, Reserve Bank of Australia.
Industrial production, price and wage indices: Australian Historical Statistics (Wray
Vamplew, ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Canada
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator, industrial production and wages: Statistics
Canada, Historical Statistics (SC-HS).
(http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/11-516-XIE/sectiona/toc.htm)
France
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator, industrial production: Beaudry, P., and Portier,
F., 2002, The French Depression in the 1930s. Review of Economic Dynamics 5( J a n u a r y ) :
73—99.
41Note that the data provided by Beaudry and Portier were derived from data in Villa,
P., 1993, Une Analyse macro-Economique de la France au XXieme Siecle.P a r i s :P r e s s e sd u
CNRS.
Germany
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator, industrial wages: Fisher, J., and Hornstein, A.,
2002, The Role of Real Wages, Productivity, and Fiscal Policy in Germany’s Great Depres-
sion, 1928—1937, Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (January): 100—127.
Italy
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator, industrial wages, production, and prices: Perri,
F., and Quadrini, V., 2002, The Great Depression in Italy: Trade Restrictions and Real Wage
Rigidities, Review of Economic Dynamics 5 (January): 128—151.
Note that the data provided by Perri and Quadrini were based on data in (i) Ercolani,
P., 1978, Documentazione Statistica di Base in (G. Fua, ed.), Lo sviluppo Economico in Italia,
3: 388—472, and (ii) Rey, G., 1991, I Conti Economici dell’Italia,B a r i :L a t e r z a .
Japan
Industrial prices and wages: (i) Hundred-Year Statistics (100 Years) of the Japanese
Economy, 1966, Statistis Department, Bank of Japan, and (ii) Supplement to Hundred-Year
Statistics of the Japanese Economy (English translation of footnotes).
Sweden
Real GDP, GDP deﬂator, industrial production, prices, and wages: John Hassler’s
data set at (http://hassler-j.iies.su.se/SWEDATA/).
Note that the data used from Hassler’s data set were derived from Krantz, O., and
Nilsson, C-A., 1975, Swedish National Product, 1861—1970, Lund.
United Kingdom
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator, industrial production, prices, and wages: Fein-
42stein, C.H., 1972, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855—
1965, Cambridge University Press.
United States
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator for 1919—29: Romer, C., 1989, The Prewar
Business Cycle Reconsidered: New Estimates of Gross National Product, 1869—1908.
Nominal and real GDP, GDP deﬂator for 1929—40: Bureau of Economic Analysis,
National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.2B and Fixed Asset Tables, Table 1.2.
Industrial production: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, series FRB
B50001.
Industrial prices: Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970,
part 1, (HSUS), U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Industrial wages: Hanes, C., 1996, Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Real Wage
Rates, 1870—1990, Journal of Economic History.
B. Characterizing the Equilibrium of the Misperceptions Model
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The next step is to log-linearize the set of equations we’re solving. We denote the log
deviations in lowercase. Note that λ’s log deviation is given by ˆ λ and ψ’s log-deviation is
given by ˆ ψ. We denote by the unhatted variables the values around which we’re taking our
approximation.
The steady state of our model is therefore determined by
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10.C= C1 + C2
11.Z=1
12.T=1 .
The deviations of our model around this steady state are determined by the following
44system of equations:
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− (ˆ λt +ˆ pt)=0
8. ˆ pt +ˆ zt +( 1− θ)(ˆ nt − ˆ kt)=ˆ rt
9. ˆ pt +ˆ zt + θ(ˆ kt − ˆ nt)=ˆ wt
10.C 1ˆ c1t + C2ˆ c2t = Cˆ ct
11. ˆ zt = ρzˆ zt−1 + ε
z
t
12. ˆ τt = ρτˆ τt−1 + ε
τ
t.
C. Solving the Model via the Method of Undetermined Coeﬃcients
In this case we deﬁne the state vector to be st =( ˆ kt, ˆ zt−1,ˆ τt−1,ε z
t,ε τ
t) and assume that
our controls can all be written as a linear function of the state. Thus, we deﬁne our controls
45as dt =( ˆ kt+1, ˆ nt,c t, ˆ pt, ˆ wt,r t, ˆ λt,ψ t), and our system has the form dt = Dst. For example,
ct = Dcst and ˆ kt+1 = Dkst. We also want to deﬁne the selector matrices for ˆ kt, ˆ zt,a n dˆ τt :
Ik =[ 10000 ]
Iz =[ 0ρz 010 ]
Iτ =[ 00ρτ 01 ]


























Handling the expectational equation:
Equation (3) involves an expectational term. Given that ˆ λt = Dλst, ˆ wt = Dwst, and
that all but the last two terms of the state vector are common knowledge at the beginning














































E{ˆ λt| ˆ wt} =[ Dλ1,D λ2,D λ3,ηD w4,ηD w5] ∗ st.
D. Characterizing the Equilibrium of the Sticky Wage Model
In this model each type of household sets their nominal wage given ¯ St. The model is
otherwise identical to the misperceptions model. We therefore present only the optimization
problems and equations that diﬀer.
Producer’s Problem: Because households are setting their wage, we include the
CES labor aggregate in the ﬁrm’s problem to derive the ﬁrm’s labor demand schedule for























































The consumer’s two stage problem is given by





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




+βEStV (Mt+1(i)/Tt,K t+1(i),H(St),z t,τt)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
subject to
Mt(i)+WtNt(i)+RtKt(i)+( Tt − 1)Mt
≥ Mt+1(i)+Pt [Kt+1(i) − (1 − δ)Kt(i)+C1t(i)+C2t(i)]
Mt(i)+( Tt − 1) ≥ PtC1t(i).



















































































In addition to this condition we have the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition for hiring labor,
which determines labor demand given the wage. This condition simpliﬁes to the same proﬁt















⇒ PtZt(1 − γ)(Kt/Nt)
γ = Wt.
E. Deriving the Shock from Prices
In our computations, we have chosen to treat the price sequence as the fundamental
object from which we derive our shocks to money. Assume that we’re starting with some
price sequence {¯ pt}T
t=0;w h e r e¯ pt denotes the log of the price index in period t in the data,
and t =0is taken to be the starting point.
The initial deviation in the price level is therefore given by ¯ p1− ¯ p0; hence, we can infer
our shock directly from
s1,5 =
¯ p1 − ¯ p0 − Dp,1:4s1,1:4
Dp,5
.
Now, because of our normalization, the price level in the second period in our model has to
be adjusted upward by the negative of the money growth rate this period. Hence, ˆ p2 − ˆ τ1
corresponds to the price level in the model. Therefore,
s2,5 =







r=1 ˆ τr − ¯ p0 − Dp,1:4st,1:4
Dp,5
is the formula that we should use in computing the implied innovation to our money supply
sequence in the model.
This result indicates that we can compute the implied outcomes of our model, given
that we are requiring it to reproduce the normalized price sequence, or




by iteratively computing the innovation to money st,5, given {¯ pt} and st,1:4, then computing
the outcomes implied by this innovation in period t, which in turn implies st+1,1:4.
5012. Tables
Table 1: Cross-Country Statistics
(Hatted Variables Are Log Deviation from 1929)
Mean Correlation with ˆ y Standard Deviation
Year ˆ y ˆ w − ˆ p π π ˆ w − ˆ p ˆ y ˆ w − ˆ p π
1930 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.22 0.24 0.04 0.03 0.04
1931 -0.06 0.09 -0.07 -0.28 0.23 0.08 0.05 0.03
1932 -0.10 0.10 -0.05 0.55 -0.04 0.11 0.07 0.05
1933 -0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.36 0.12 0.14 0.07 0.03
51Table 2: Output and Prices in 1932




















52Table 3: Benchmark Parameters
θ β σ δ α ρz ρτ
.33 .95 .92 .07 .5 .90 .00
T a b l e4 :I m p a c to fa1 0P e r c e n tD e ﬂation on Labor (ˆ n)







Table 5: Output Decomposition Bounds
Percentage of Output Change Explained by
Monetary Shock Productivity Shock
η Lower Upper Lower Upper
-0.75 6 45 55 94
-0.50 11 46 54 89
-0.25 15 47 53 85
0.00 18 48 52 82
53Table 6: Output Decomposition with Alternative Orthogonalization
Percentage of Output Change Explained by
Money and Productivity Orthogonal to





54Table 7: Output Change Due to
Country-SpeciﬁcC o m p o n e n ta n d






Table 8: Output Decomposition Bounds
Two η Experiment29
Percentage of Output Change Explained
Money Shocks Productivity Shocks
Lower Upper Lower Upper
12 53 47 88
29The following countries were assigned an η of 0: Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, and
the United States. The rest were assigned an η of −0.80.
55Table 9: Correlation of Industrial Production (IP) and
Producer Prices (PPI) and Correlation
of IP and Wages Deﬂated by PPI
(Log-Deviation from 1929)30
Year IP and PPI IP and W/PPI
1931 -0.34 0.45
1933 -0.25 -0.04
Table 10: Characteristics of the Shocks η = −0.50
Year Mean(εz) Std(εz) Mean(ετ) Std(ετ) Corr(εz,ε τ)
1930 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.23
1931 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.18
1932 -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.06 0.23
1933 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.56
30As is typically done in the literature, we included a much broader group of countries because the data
availability is greater for these variables. This includes our standard set of countries, except Czechoslovakia,
Japan, and Switzerland, and the addition of Hungary. The IP vs. PPI correlation excludes only Japan and
Switzerland from our standard set of countries, and also adds Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, and Spain.
56Table 11: Cross-Country Correlation of TFP
with Other Factors in 1932 (η = −0.50)31
Factors Corr
Trade Share in 1929 0.19
Agricultural Share in 1929 0.42
Change in Real Exchange Rate 1929-32 0.51
Bernanke-James Financial Variable -0.58
Change in Real Stock Prices 1930-31 0.68
Change in Real Stock Prices 1929-30 0.54
31All variables, with the exception of the trade and agriculture shares, are in terms of their log-deviation
from 1929.
5713. Appendix Tables
Tables A1 and A2 show the initial impact of a deﬂation shock in the sticky wage model
and in the misperceptions model with the benchmark value of η.
Table A1: Impulse Response to
1 Percent Negative Money Shock
Sticky Wage Model (in percent)
Period ˆ y ˆ n ˆ w − ˆ p ˆ p
1 -1.47 -2.19 0.72 -0.72
Table A2: Impulse Response to
1 Percent Negative Money Shock
Misperceptions Model (in percent)
(η = −0.5)
Period ˆ y ˆ n ˆ w − ˆ p ˆ p
1 -0.59 -0.87 0.29 -0.89
Table A3 shows the data in Figure 2, and Table A4 shows the data used in Figure 4.
58Table A3: Log Deviations from 1929 in Output and Productivity32
Output Productivity
Country 1930 1931 1932 1933 1930 1931 1932 1933
Australia 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.05* 0.01* 0.03* 0.04*
Canada -0.05 -0.18 -0.29 -0.36 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 -0.22
France 0.01 -0.06 -0.11 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08
Germany -0.07 -0.20 -0.28 -0.20 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03
Japan 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.00* 0.06* 0.06* 0.08*
U.K. 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
U.S. -0.10 -0.19 -0.33 -0.35 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.20
Table A4: Log Productivity Deviations from 192933
Model (η = −0.50) Data
Country 1930 1931 1932 1933 1930 1931 1932 1933
Australia 0.07* 0.03* 0.01* -0.01* 0.05* 0.01* 0.03* 0.04*
Canada -0.02 -0.09 -0.14 -0.22 -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 -0.22
France 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08
Germany -0.04 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03
Japan 0.07* 0.10* 0.01* 0.06* 0.00* 0.06* 0.06* 0.08*
U.K. 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
U.S. -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 -0.21 -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.20
32The productivity measure is labor productivity if the variable has an “*” and total factor productivity
otherwise.
33In order to make as valid a comparison as possible, we compared TFP in the model to TFP in the data,
and labor productivity in the model to labor productivity in the data (for those countries for which we only
had labor productivity). The productivity measure is labor productivity if the variable has an “*” and total
factor productivity otherwise.
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